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1. COMPETITION IN THE SHIPPING BUSINESS. 
The shipping business can be started freely and easily. 
Consequently, in the shipping world, it is as free and easy 
to begin competition with others as to join the competition 
already going on. In other words, the shipping business is 
of a kind which admits of free competition for all. From 
this point of view, it may be said to be highly competitive 
by nature. 
But if free competition means not only the freedom 
with which one can start or join in it, but the absence of 
all restrictions on the act of carrying on competition (compe-
titive acts), and the freedom of withdrawing from competi-
tion, rivalry in shipping circles cannot necessarily described 
as free, for although the shipping business, by virtue of its 
nature, carries no restrictions on the starting, on the joining 
in, and on the conducting of competition, there is not so much 
1) This article is a commentary on the .. Fall of Freight Rates under 
Competition," which, forming the first part of my article, appeared in the 
first number of this Review under the caption "Shipping Combinations as 
seen from the Viewpoint of Freight theory." 
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freedom in withdrawing from the competition as there is in 
joining in it. 
The reason why withdrawal from competition is not free 
in the shipping business is that the major part of the work-
ing capital is fixed in the shape of vessels. Unlike factories, 
a vessel cannot be operated in part, nor can it be suspended 
from operation in part. Its whole activity must be suspended 
or it must be operated as a whole. If, therefore, those who 
are engaged in marine transportation desire to curtail their 
business under the pressure of competition, they have no 
alternative but to suspend the operation of at least one of 
their vessels, that is to say, to lay it up. On the other hand, 
when a vessel is laid up, not only is the whole of the capital 
invested in it left unutilised but its owner is involved in 
heavy expense. Thus, shipowners have to continue their 
competition, though against their will, if they find that the 
loss entailed upon them by continuing competition is less than 
what they expect to incur if they lay up their vessels. 
Although vessels constitute fixed capital, from the point 
of view of those engaged in marine transportation, they are, 
in a sense, a kind of commodities in the world market. If 
they desire to sell their vessels, they are able to find pur-
chasers. With regard to those vessels the original price of 
which was largely written off during the days of the busi-
ness boom, they can be sold without loss, nay, with a good 
margin of profit. On the other hand in the case of those 
vessels the original price of which had not been written off 
before the business depression set in, they cannot be sold 
unless at a heavy loss. The more prosperous the shipping 
business becomes, the more do vessels acquire the nature of 
a commodity and vice versa. If competition forces the freight 
rate down below the cost of marine service and vessels are 
operated at a loss, such vessels, as productive property, are 
of minus value. Such being the case, the owners of such 
vessels find it impossible to sell their vessels, unless there 
happen to be buyers who are optimistic of the future pros-
pects of the shipping -world. So long as these vessels are 
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left on their hands, they form a fixed capital, without doubt, 
and so long as shipowners are burdened with this fixed 
capital they are not in a position to withdraw from shipping 
competition, being compelled to keep up rivalry against their 
will. This circumstance rather militates against the theory 
that competition in shipping circles is free. 
As already stated, although one is free to join shipping 
competition, one is not free to withdraw from it, as the 
result of which there is a tendency for the rivalry in the 
shipping world to grow keener. There are, moreover in 
shipping circles, causes which stimulate competition. As the 
more important of these causes, the following two facts may 
be mentioned:-
(1) Inasmuch as it is both easy and free to start the 
shipping business, one can, on the return of shipping pros-
perity, newly start it or extend the scope of the business 
already in operation, with the result that the number of new 
ships grows and the supply of tonnage in the shipping 
market increases. In days of business prosperity, the in-
creased tonnage shares in the profits that the boom brings 
to the shipping industry, in competition with the tonnage 
already available, and when the business depression sets in, 
it renders the competition in shipping circles generally all 
the keener. Viewed from standpoint of an individual ship-
owner, it is naturally said that if he sees that the shipping 
depression is not likely to be removed for same time, he can 
withdraw without loss from the shipping competition by 
disposing of his ships, in case of their original prices have 
already been largely written off. If he has ships whose cost 
of marine service is comparatively high, he can better his 
shipping business account, as a whole, by selling them even 
at a loss, before the market freight rate has declined to a 
point equivalent to the cost of its marine service, thereby 
improving his position in relation to his strong competitors 
to a certain extent. But these vessels still continue their 
activity in the shipping market after they have changed 
hands, and, in fact, the >lew owner is in a position to carry 
66 s. KOJIMA 
on competition with some advantage until the shipping 
depression deepens, as he will probably have bought them 
at prices which enable him to operate at a profit at the ruling 
freight rate. Such being the case, the ebb and flow of the 
tides that set in the shipping world always stimulate shipping 
competition. 
(2) The reduction in the cost of marine service which 
results from the development of the shipbuilding and the 
mechanical industries is another stimulant to competition in 
shipping circles. In the railway business which is mono-
polistic, technical improvements and inventions, which tend 
to lower the cost of its service, go to increase the profit of 
those who operate the business almost exclusively, but in 
the shipping business, in which competition is free, they 
never fail to create new rivals or accentuate the competition 
between shipowners. In the shipping business, new devices 
are constantly being invented and applied by which the cost 
of marine service can be reduced. Indeed, the improve-
ments and inventions made in the shipbuilding and the 
mechanical industries are simply surprising. These improve-
ments and inventions are so designed as to enable marine 
service to be offered more cheaply than older ships have 
been able to offer. In the days when the shipping business 
prospers, therefore, a greater margin of profit can be realised 
by operating these new ships. Even when the business is 
so depressed that none of the owners of old ships is able 
to find any profit at the freight rate ruling in the market, 
a fair profit can be gained by operating ships which are 
provided with these new improvements and inventions. This 
being so, men of an enterprising spirit may be found to 
enter the shipping world as new competitors with their ships 
armed with new appliances, not only in the days of shipping 
prosperity but in those of depression. As for the owners 
of shipyards and machinery works, they put forth increasing 
endeavours to introduce improvements and make inventions, 
wherever possible, as they know that if they can produce 
ships which can be worked more profitably than those 
---- ------- ----
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already operating, they can count on orders being placed 
with their works for the construction of ships even in days 
of shipping depression. So long as new improvements and 
inventions are made in the shipping and mechanical in· 
dustries, there does exist a factor which stimulates rivalry 
in the shipping business in the days of depression as well 
as in time of shipping prosperity. 
As already mentioned, the shipping business not only 
affords a very free field of activity for all, but is of a nature 
that can be started with great ease, and this fact, coupled with 
the prosperity that often comes to the shipping business and 
the improvements and inventions that are constantly made in 
the shipping and mechanical industries, tends to accentuate 
shipping competition. It is hardly necessary to say that the 
campetition, when it is allowed to take its natural course, 
leads inevitably to the reauction of the freight rate. When 
the demand for marine service declines and there occurs an 
over-supply of such service, or, in other words, when the 
demand for tonnage falls off and a surplus of tonnage is 
brought about, there arises a sharp competition between 
shipowners who try to procure cargoes for their ships by 
reducing· freight rates. Such is not confined only in the 
tramp business. In the liner business the case is almost 
the same. The offer of marine service at cheap freight rates 
is the tactics usually employed by those shipowners who 
desire to open a regular steamship service on a line on 
which other shipowners are already operating their ships. 
In either case, the freight rate is bound to fall, as long as 
the competition continues and grows keener. How far can 
the freight rate be lowered, then, as the result of the 
competition? 
2. "LAYING·UP POINT" OF FREIGHT RATE 
In order to explain the limit to which the freight rate 
can be lowered, some explanation is required about the 
elements constituting the cost of marine service. The cost 
----- ----_.-
- ------ -- ---------.-.-----
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of marine service can be classified in different ways, but 
here the classification will be made with the ship as the basic 
factor, for convenience sake in our present purpose. The cost 
of marine service may be said to consist of the fixed cost, or 
the coat concerning the ship which forms the fixed capital, 
viz., the interest on the original price of the ship, the deprecia-
tion of the ship's value; the managing cost, as represented 
by the insurance for the ship, cost of repairs, wages and 
the pay for the crew and officers, cost of food supplied to 
the crew and to the officers, cost of the articles consumed, 
miscellaneous expense on board, and shore expenses (that is 
to say, part of the so·called office expense allotted to it) ; 
and the navigation and handling costs, namely, fuel enpense, 
cargo expense, expense of account of passengers, and harbour 
expense. As regards the fixed cast, it is absolutely neces-
sary, so long as the shipping business is carried on, no 
matter whether marine service is offered or not, while the 
managing cost can be somewhat reduced, in case marine 
service is not supplied, though some part of this cost is 
needed, irrespective of marine service. So far as the naviga-
tion and handling cost is concerned, this is not required at 
ali, if marine service is not supplied. 
The amount as well as the percentage of the fixed, the 
managing, and the navigation and handling costs varies 
according to the lines on which ships are employed, and also 
on the size and the age of the ships and the kinds of engines 
used, and the nature of the cargo carried; but it is hardly 
necessary to say that when the freight revenue falls short of 
the aggregate of all these expenses, the shipowner stands to 
lose by continuing navigation. So, if the shipping business 
is one which could be suspended without any loss being 
incurred, and if those in this business could freely withdraw 
from competition at any time, shipowners would, in such 
cases, suspend the operation of their vessels and lay them up. 
But if a shipowner withdraws from competition and 
decides to lay up his ships, he must be prepared to bear the 
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invested in his ships, and the positive cost needed for the 
maintenance of the ships, or part of the managing cost. It 
is clearly a loss to the shipowner that he has to bear such 
expenses in time of business suspension. From the point of 
view of the shipowners, therefore, if the loss arising from 
continuing their marine transportion business is less than 
the loss that results from laying up their ships, it is better 
for them to continue the business, even though the freight 
rate does not come up to the cost of marine service. This 
raises the question how great a decline in the freight revenue 
caused by the falling of market freight rates makes the loss 
arising from continuing the shipping business equal to the 
loss resulting from the laying up of ships. 
Now let f denote the fixed cost during a certain period, 
m, the managing cost involved when the ship is in operation, 
n, the navigation and handling cost, m', the managing cost 
involved when the ship is laid up, and E, the freight earning, 
during the same period respectively. Then the total costs of 
marine service can be indicated by (f+ m + n), while the loss 
involved in transportion by U+m+n)-E, and the loss reo 
suIting from the laying up of the ships by U+m'). Thus 
it will be seen that the formulae (a) and (b) 
(a) (f+m+n)-E=(f+m') 
(b) E=(m-m')+n 
represent the freight earning on the demarcation line divid-
ing the continuance of marine service and the laying up of 
the ships on the part of the shipowners. If a shipowner 
can realise an earning above this standard, he will continue 
to keep his ships in operation; while if the freight earning 
falls below it, he will, theoretically to say, decide to lay up 
his ships, from the economic point of view. Therefore I 
want to say that the earning of a ship is at the laying-up 
point, when it is equivalent to E, in the equation of 
E=(m-m')+n. 
In my article in the first number of this Review, I employed the formula, 
c-x=l, in explaining the layi~g·up point. The relation of this formula to 
that which I now adopt in the present article can be made clear later on. 
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Inasmuch as the shipowner finds it advantageous to 
continue marine service until the laying·up point is reached, 
even if the freight earning does not come up to the cost of 
marine service, no relaxation of competition can be looked 
for, so long as the freight earning is above the laying·up 
point. At what point, then, the freight rate settles itself under 
such competition? Before replying to this question, it is neces· 
sary to add a little more explanation about the laying·up point. 
As already stated, the laying-up point of shipping earn-
ing can be indicated by 
E=(m-m')+n 
The values of the terms of this equation, however, differ 
with the ship. As can be seen from the above formula, 
the laying-up point is in direct proportion to m, represent-
ing the managing costs when ships are operating, and the 
navigation and handling costs, n, and in inverse propor-
tion to m', which represents the managing costs when 
ships are laid up. The various expenses incurred while 
ships are laid up, as represented by m', have nothing 
~o do with the efficiency of ships and engines, but the 
expenses on account of the officers and crew, fuel and the 
loading and landing of cargo, which are included in m and 
n, representing the managing costs 2nd the navigation and 
handling costs respectively, have a good deal to do with the 
efficiency of ships and engines, because ships with high 
efficiency can be worked by a comparatively small crew, and 
little trouble is involved in the loading and landing of cargo 
or in taking in fuel. Again, highly efficient engines need a 
comparatively small quantity of fuel to generate an unusual 
quantum of horse power. The value of m and n is smaller 
for ships and engines of high efficiency as compared with 
their value for ships of lower efficiency, with the natural 
result that both the cost of marine service and of the laying-
up point of freight earning are low. 
Thus, the laying-up point varies with the ship. Even 
with the same vessel, -it varies, as the quantity of the goods 
.. 
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which it chances to carry differs. In the former formula 
indicating the laying-up point, E represents the freight earn-
ing. Freight earning is the product of the quantity of cargo 
loaded on a ship multiplied by the rate of freight. Taking 
t' to indicate the goods loaded and r the rate of freight, the 
equation E = rt' will be obtained, and the laying-up point 





In this equation, it is shown that r or the freight rate 
at the laying-up point is proportional to (m - m') + n and in 
inverse proportion to t' or the quantity of goods loaded. In 
the relation of t' to (m-m') +n, as I' or the quantity of goods 
loaded becomes smaller, the special cost of marine service 
in regard to the transportation of cargo, which is induded 
in what is expressed by (m-m,)+n, becomes equally smaller, 
but the cost to be reduced forms only a small part of the 
navigation and handling costs represented by n. The manag-
ing costs involved when the ship is in operation, as indicated 
by the letter m, has nothing to do with the size of 1'. Nor 
has m', which stands for the managing costs involved when 
the ship is laid up anything to do with 1'. Be it observed 
that m is always larger than mi. Even the cost of fuel, 
which constitutes the heaviest part of the navigation and 
handling costs, as represented by n, is not influenced sub-
stantially by the size of t'. As to pilotage, harbour dues 
and tonnage duty, they have nothing whatever to do 
with t'. Only the wages for the coolies employed in loading 
and landing operations, the cost of materials needed for such 
operations and the insurance for the carriage of the goods 
shipped, increase or decrease in proportion to the size of 1'. 
The special cost of marine service for the goods carried 
varies according to the steamship routes, especially the ship-
ping and landing ports, and the kinds of goods carried, and 
I yet, it forms only a sn:all part of the whole, represented by 
~!---------------~ 
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(m-m')+n. The reduction that comes about in (m-m')+n, 
because of the reduction in I', is very slight, and in no 
circumstances is there any proportionate increase or decrease 
between (m-m')+n and I'. 
As the rate at which (m-m')+n is reduced in conse-
quence of the reduction in I' is comparatively very slight, 
.. cl h t . (m-m')+n t· th lt lS ear t a ln r= I' ,r, as represen lng e 
freight rate at the laying-up point, waxes as t' becomes 
smaller. Now, let the full carrying capacity of the ship be 
indicated by I, then her laying-up point is lowest when I' 
(m-m')+n d is equal to t, that is to say, when r t ,an as 
t' becomes smalier than t, the freight rate representing the 
laying-up point goes higher. In other words, when the 
quantity of goods which the ship is called upon to carry is 
equal to her fuli carrying capacity, that is to say, when her 
holds are fuIiy occupied, the freight rate denoting her laying-
up point is lowest. As the quantity of goods which she 
chances to carry falls below her full carrying capacity, the 
freight rate embodying her laying-up point becomes gradualiy 
higher. Thus, the laying-up point becomes higher or lower, 
according to the quantity of goods which the ship happens 
to carry. 
But as it is intended that the cost of a number of 
sailings (joint costs of several trips) should be met out 
of the total freight earning accruing from a succession of 
voyages, the ship is not to be laid up simply because the 
freight earning for a single trip has falien short of the 
laying-up point. It is not until there occurs a general decline 
in the quantity of the goods entrusted to her for transporta-
tion on several voyages or there has developed a tendency 
for the earning from voyages to fall below her laying-up 
point that she is laid up. Supposing that a ship makes five 
voyages, on each of which she is to carry a different kind 
of merchandise, a, b, c. d and e, there will be five kinds of 
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rand t'. In this case, the ship's earning is at the laying·up 
point when it can be shown by the following formula:-
(r"t'" + r,.t',. + rj'" + r"t'., + rJ'.) = (m - m') + n 
And when there develops a tendency for 
(r"t'" + r"t'lo+ r"t',,+ r"t'" + r.t'.) < (m-m) +n 
to continue, this ship is compelled to be laid up. 
In order to generalise the question of the laying·up point, 
let us indicate the general numerical value of r... r,., r", r", 
r" ...... by R and the number of terms by y, and then find 
the average quantity of goods carried. Ships are not always 
loaded to their fullest capacity, nor do they always make 
voyages in a condi\ion little better than in ballast. There 
ought, therefore, to be an average quantity of goods carried 
in ordinary circumstances. Let this average quantity of goods 
carried be indicated by T. T, like t which represents the 
ship's full carrying capacity, has a fixed numerical value for 
a specific ship. Then we have a formula shown by 
E (r"t'"+r"t',.+r.t' •. +r,,t'.,+r.t',,+ ...... ) RT 
y 




In this way, a ship may be said to be at the laying-up 
point when the market freight rate declines to the extent 
of R. 
Next, the laying-up point, as already explained, means 
that the market freight rate which, being below the cost of 
marine service, makes the loss resulting from the continuance 
The formula employed in my former article to indicate the laying-up 
point was c-x=l. If the formula used in the present article is applied. x 
. . . /+m+n . /+m' . (m-m')+n 
IS R m the present case, C IS. T ,lIS -T- and c-l IS T . 
_-.:!1~ _________ -----~ 
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of marine service equal to the loss arising out of the laying-
up of ships. Should the market freight rate decline to this 
point, the shipowner might well be expected to lay up his 
ships, if the whole situation be viewed from the economic 
point of view exclusively. But, as a matter of fact, the ship-
owner cannot frame his business policy merely in considera-
tion of the relation between revenue and expenditure. 
Accordingly, even when the market freight rate is below the 
laying-up point referred to, the shipowner may not decide 
to lay up his vessels, and, in fact, some vessels are operating 
in competition with their rivals at the market freight rate 
which is below the laying-up point. 
The circumstances which prevent shipowners from fram-
ing their business policy solelY out of regard for the relation 
between revenue and expenditure are particularly marked in 
connection with the operation of regular lines. In a regular 
steamship service which is maintained in competition with 
other rivals, the shipowner cannot suspend it even for a 
time. For him to withdraw his ships from it to avoid 
competition means the loss of the position which has been 
built up by years of hard labour, the result being that the 
line is entirely given up to his rivals. If he desires to regain 
his former position on the line at a later date, it is very 
doubtful whether he will succeed in his attempt, even if he 
put forth twice as much endeavour as he used to .. It, there-
fore, follows that for the operator of a regular service to 
withdraw his ships from it under such circumstances means, 
not a temporary suspension of service, but the permanent 
abandonment of it. Entirely different circumstances rule in 
regard to tramp steamship services, from which shipowners 
can as easily withdraw their ships as they can resume them 
on the return of shipping prosperity. Such being the case, 
the owners of regular lines are compelled to maintain their 
lines at heavy sacrifice, even if, considered from the economic 
point of view only, it is advisable to lay up their vessels. 
The laying-up point, therefore, counts for little in a competi-
tion between the operators of regular lines. 
--.--------
----~.---,~-~- -_. - ... -----_.,,----
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In the tramp services also, shipowners sometimes refuse 
to lay up their ships even when the market freight rate is 
below the laying-up point. One instance of this is furnished 
when a ship is mortgaged. The current price of a ship be-
comes nil when the cost of marine service supplied by it is 
equal to the market freight. If anybody attaches any value to 
it, it is because he anticipates a rise in freight. In existing 
circumstances, it has no value whatever as productive pro-
perty, apart from the value of the materials of which it is 
built. When the market freight not only falls below the 
cost of marine service but reaches the laying-up point, the 
possession of the ship clearly means a loss to its owner. 
Then, the ship can only be of minus value. If, therefore, 
a debtor shipowner lays up his ship in mortage, the creditor 
will never fail to demand an additional security, as the 
laying-up the ship itself indicates that the mortgage is of 
minus value. If the creditor is well posted up in shipping 
matters, he will demand an additional mortgage before the 
market freight falls below the cost of marine service, but 
as the voyage account is not very evident to outsiders, the 
creditor remains indifferent in most cases, so long as the 
ship in question is operating. Once it is laid up, however, 
it becomes clear even to the most unobservant creditor 
that it has been reduced to a minus value, and he will then 
insist upon having fresh mortgage. As for the debtor ship-
owner, he tries, by hook or by crook, to continue his business 
at a loss in competition with his rivals, in order to avoid the 
painful necessity of putting up additional security, hoping in 
the meanwhile for a fortuitous return of shipping prosperity. 
Another example of the continuance of marine service 
at a loss on the part of the trampowners instead of laying-up 
their vessels, is seen when they attempt to avoid the stop-
page of the supply of funds that would otherwise take place. 
In the case 'Of a small shipowner who is doing the shipping 
business with a few tramp steamers, the instant he decides 
to lay up his vessels, the supply of funds will be cut off, 
and if he has no revenue other than shipping, he will soon 
----~------------------~------------------------~ 
76 s. KOJIMA 
find himself unable either to pay his office expenses or 
to meet his costs of living. While, on the other hand, if 
he keeps his ships in operation under very adverse circum-
stances or at a loss, he can count on some revenue and can 
make shift to keep up his business. Such being the case, 
a shipowner with a small fund to draw upon is sometimes 
found to be continuing his business at a freight below the 
laying-up point, anxiously awaiting the return of shipping 
prosperity in the meanwhile. 
Since shipowners do not necessarily decide to lay up 
their vessels simply because they cannot find their account 
in continuing operation, it would be too hasty to conclude 
that the decline of freight to a point below the laying-up 
point results inevitably in the withdrawal of their ships from 
the actual service, but, apart from the owners of regular 
liners, it is only the exceptional trampowners who would 
adopt such reckless methods of management. It is all very 
well if, due to changes in the position of those who need 
tonnage, there comes about the revival of freight at an 
opportunate moment, when this reckless mode of business 
management is being pursued, but if such favourable changes 
do not occur, the hopes for the return of business prosperity 
will be shattered and his vessels will eventually have to be 
withdrawn from actual service. Trampowners are not gene-
rally expected long to keep up their competition when freight 
rules below the laying-up point, and when there is a persis-
tent tendency for freight to decline. As a general rule, 
tramp steamers are laid up, as the market freight rate drops 
to the laying·up point. 
3. THE LOWEST LIMIT OF FREIGHT RATE 
As already explained, in the shipping business, ships 
keep up their active service in competition with their rivals, 
so long as the market freight remains above the laying-up 
point, even if it does not make up for the cost of marine 
service. Granting, then, that ships are laid up as freight 
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declines, to what extent can freight fall? I now propose to 
take up this proposition which was previously formulated. 
This question was discussed in the article appearing in the 
first number of this" Review", but in order to elucidate my 
point of view more clearly, I must now deal more in fuller 
detail with it. 
It is superfluous to say that a decline in freight is caused 
by an over·supply of tonnage. Three different cases of an 
over-supply of tonnage are conceivable. The first case is 
that the tonnage available at a given freight rate exceeds 
the demand for tonnage at that freight rate. This is an 
over-supply of tonnage in a generally accepted sense. The 
second case is that the tonnage available exceeds the demand 
for it, if freight rates which are above the cost of marine 
service are charged by all. The last case is that the tonnage 
available cxceeds the demand for it, if freight rates charged 
by all are above the laying-up point. The second and last 
cases are special cases of an over-supply of tonnage in the 
sense of the first-mentioned case. When it becomes accen· 
tuated to a certain extent, the second case comes about, 
and when the excess of supply mentioned in the second case 
grows more extreme, the last-mentioned case is created. 
As what I propose to study in the present article refers to 
the limit of the decline of freight under the pressure of com-
petition, the over-supply of tonnage in the sense of the 
last-mentioned case is kept in view in the discourse that 
follows. 
Needless to say, the decline of freight is most pronounced 
when there occurs an over-supply of tonnage in the sense 
of the last-mentioned case. As, in this case, an excess of 
supply takes place, if all ships would charge rates above their 
laying-up points, ships with high laying-up points will have 
to retire from actual service to the extent of the over-supply 
actually existing, as they are unable to compete successfully 
with those with lower laying-up points. In consequence, the 
market freight is fixed at the laying-up point of the ships 
which are on the border line between actual service and 
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retirement from service, or, in other words, at the highest 
of the laying-up points of the vessels remaining in the field 
. of actual service_ This constitutes the lowest limit to which 
the freight rate can be lowered by competition in the tramp 
business. 
We can conceive various rates of freight, but it must 
be remembered that different ships stand differently under 
each of these rates. For instance, a freight which is above 
the cost of marine service with some ships may be below 
it with other ships, and even below the laying-up point with 
some of these vessels. With regard to the ships falling 
under the last-mentioned category, they are withdrawn from 
service, as the loss caused by operating them at this freight 
is heavier than that which is incurred by laying them up. 
As regards those ships with which this freight is below their 
cost of marine service but above their laying-up points, they 
continue in actual service in spite of the loss which is 
incurred by doing so, as the loss suffered by continued opera-
tion is smaller than the loss caused by laying them up. 
Thus, in a market in which there is an over-supply of 
tonnage in the sense of the last-mentioned case, a freight 
rate which is fixed when the surplus of tonnage is excluded 
from the field of actual service and an equilibrium found 
between the tonnage 
supplied and the 
tonnage demanded 
-that is to say, a 
market freight rate 
-ought to be equi-
valent to the amount 
representing the lay-
ing-up point of ships 
on the border line 
of actual service. 
I will repeat 
my explanation of 
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means of a diagram, which I used in my article appearing 
in the first number of this Review. In the diagram, the 
base OX represents quantity, i.e., tonnage in our case, and 
Oe on the OX line represents the amount of tonnage of 
the ships actually existing in a certain shipping market, 
while the length of any line, from the left end, running 
parallel to the OX line above it represents the amount 
of tonnage supplied or demanded at various freight rate. 
The height of the OY line which crosses the OX line 
perpendicularly or that of the lines standing parallel to the 
OY line represent prices, i.e., freight rates. The DD' line is 
what is called a demand curve which represents the 
condition of those who demand tonnage at certain periods, 
and in this diagram it shows a series of tonnage in demand 
at freight rates of various grades. The ee' line represents 
a series of the costs of marine service per a transportation 
unit (one ton for instance) for each vessel standing in order 
. f+m+n 
on the base OX (or C III C T in the formula al· 
ready given). The RR' line represents a series of freight 
rates at the laying·up points for a transportation unit for 
. (m-m')+n 
each vessel (or R III R T ). (Therefore, the dis· 
tance between the ee' line and the RR' line represents 
f+m+n (m-m')+n f+m' T T T or the cost of laying up 
vessels for the unit of the average tonnage carried by each 
of the vessels). If those engaged in marine carrier service 
were to refuse to undertake the transportation of goods at 
rates below the cost of marine service, the tonnage which 
would be active would be confined to Ob, and the freight 
rate would find its level at p. But, as already mentioned, 
they are ready to undertake the transportation of goods even 
at rates below the cost of marine service, provided they are 
above the laying·up point, the Oc tonnage will continue in 
service, and the freight rate will settle at r, instead of at p. 
In this case, therefore, the supply curve is the RR' line, not 
--~ 
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the ee' line. Accordingly, the RR' line represents not only 
a series of the laying'up points but that of the prices at 
which those engaged in marine transportation respectively 
are ready to offer their marine service (as represented by 
the quantity of tonnage). 
In a shipping market in which the relation between 
supply and demand can be indicated by the diagram just 
explained, the market freight rate settles at r, and of the 
existing tonnage Oe, the tonnage Oc remains in service, 
while ce, being laid up, is excluded from actual service. 
Even in regard to Oc representing in this case the tonnage 
in actual supply that which operates at rates above its cost 
of marine service, or that which realises the business profit 
is limited to Oa. The vessels that come between a and c 
operate at rates below their cost of marine service, or, in 
other words, at a loss. Supposing that the tonnage in the 
given market is Ob, instead of Oe, then the freight rate will 
settle at the point p in order to maintain equilibrium between 
supply and demand, and will accord with the cost of marine 
service for the vessels on the border line of supply. The 
result is that the vessels that come between a and b need 
not operate at any freight below the cost of their marine 
service, and all except those vessels which are at b, which 
forms the border line of supply, can gain some profit, while 
those between 0 and a are able to realise a bigger profit 
than when the tonnage in actual supply is Oe. In our case, 
however, the tonnage in actual supply is Oe, instead of Ob, 
as referred to, the vessels between 0 and b will have to 
compete with those between band e, and as the result of 
the freight rate settling at the point r, only ce will have to 
be laid up. While bc will continue in service, instead of 
being laid up, ab must be operated at a loss, and the profit 
of Oa will be red uced. (But viewed from the standpoint of 
the bc or ce tonnage, if there did not exist the tonnage Oa 
or Ob, both the ee' line and the RR' line would be obliterated 
left of the vertical line falling on a or on b, and it would 
move leftward to tl}e extent of Oa or Ob, with the result 
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that the freight rate would settle at a point higher than the 
qoint p on the DD' line, and some of this tonnage would 
be able to operate with some profit, while some would be 
saved from the fate of being laid up, though some loss 
would attend their operation. As this, however, is aside 
from the question which demands immediate attention, I wiII 
take it up here.) 
4. THE SLOW RECOVERY OF FREIGHT THROUGH 
CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH 
SUPPLIERS. 
Under the conditions referred to, the market freight 
rate is fixed at the point r. So long as there occurs no 
change in the position of those who demand tonnage, it 
cannot rise above that point. It, therefore, follows that the 
tonnage between a and c continues operation at a loss, 
provided these conditions persist and there is the where-
withal to do so. Of course, if it were clear from the 
beginning that such conditions would continue to endure for 
a long time, all would be willing to give up their business 
as quickly as possible so as to avoid their capitals becoming 
exhausted on account of losses. But as the future course 
of events is unknown to anybody, many continue their 
business under unfavourable conditions in the hope that even 
if there be no visible sign of the immediate return of busi-
ness prosperity, at the present time, that such a sign will 
appear sooner or later, and that the revival of business will 
become a reality. Moreover, those in shipping circles will 
remember that a period of deep depression was often followed 
by one of great prosperity, and that the occurrence of 
emergencies such as war put a sudden end to the business 
stagnation and ushered in an era of extraordinary business 
activity. On" such occasions, they could not only repay the 
heavy debts contracted in the days of the shipping depression 
but in addition amass big fortunes. The recollection of such 
experiences strengthens them in their determination to keep 
! 
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their vessels in actual service, so long as they can find 
money to do so, even at a loss, and so long as they keep 
up their competition under such conditions, it is impossible 
to expect the freight rate to recover to the point of paying 
for the cost of marine service, provided there occurs no 
change in the condition of those who demand tonnage. 
While the freight rate is at the point r, the ce tonnage 
is laid up, but this laid·up tonnage plays its part in the 
changes that subsequently come over the freight rates. 
Although it is not actually available while it is laid up, yet 
it is, in the shipping market, an entity embodying a potential 
supply, as they still exist as ships, and their laying·up is 
. simply for reasons connected with freight rates. If the 
market freight rate rises above r, some of this tonnage comes 
back into the field of actual supply, because it finds that it 
is relatively more advantageous to operate at that freight 
rate than to remain laid up. And this has the effect of 
preventing freight from recovering. 
Supposing that no change, in the case described above, 
takes place in the condition of those who demand tonnage and 
that thiogs go on as they have been, the loss of the ac 
tonnage will increase, as time passes. Especially witb regard 
to the vessels near the point c, the amount of loss will 
mount up considerably with the lapse of time, as the losses 
from fruitless voyages are heavy. In the meantime, the ce 
tonnage, while it is laid up, goes on suffering the loss of a 
certain amount every day or every month, and here also 
the losses grow very heavy as time passes. Such being the. 
case, some owners of the tonnage falling between a and c 
and c and e finding themselves unable to go on bearing 
such losses, decide to break up their vessels or go bankrupt. 
The ships belonging to bankrupt shipowners may either be 
disposed of at the price of the materials only of which they 
are built or be sold, at very reduced prices, to purchasers 
who have hopes of the recovery of business. But as this 
simply means that the purchasers of such ships become the 
sufferers of the lo~ses in lieu of the sellers, these ships must 
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sooner or later be broken up. (As already explained, ships 
which are already at the laying·up point in relation to the 
ruling market freight rate, though they remain as ships, are 
of minus value as productive property.) Thus, so long as 
no change comes over the condition of those who demand 
tonnage, ships which are operating at a loss and those which 
are laid up are destined to be broken up sooner or later, 
with the result that there will be a reduction both in the 
actual supply of tonnage and in the potential supply of :t, 
and a gradual rise in freight rate owing to the altered 
situation on the part of the suppliers. 
Inasmuch, however, as nobody can foresee what may 
happen in future, neither the shipowners who are operating 
their ships at a loss nor those who keep their ships laid up 
decide to break them up, unless they go bankrupt or their 
bankruptcy becomes evident. This being so, the rise of the 
freight rate through the altered conditions on the part of 
suppliers cannot be easily expected, even if the marlcet 
freight rate falls below the point r. Furthermore, the time 
when ships are broken up, granting that they are of the 
same age, is largely in inverse proportion to the amount of 
funds posessed by their owners, and wealthy shipowners 
can put up with the losses caused by the laying up of their 
ships for a long time. For instance, the Shipping Board of 
the United States, which began to lay up its vessels in 1920, 
still keeps idle steamers with an aggregate tonnage of over 
4,000,000. This is, of course, an exceptional case, but it is 
a fact that wealthy shipowners can afford to keep their shh)s 
idle for a long time, despite the heavy losses which are 
inflicted upon them on that account. While they are laid 
up, instead of being broken up, they remain as potential 
suppliers of tonnage, and the conditions favourable to the 
recovery of freight, if they are created through the breaking 
up of ships belonging to other owners, are adversely affected 
by their re·entry into the field of the actual supply of 
tonnage. 
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5. THE CONVERSION OF NATURAL VALUE INTO 
ARTIFICIAL VALUE. 
The normal price theory has it that when competition 
is natural (that is to say, under the so·called free competi-
tion), the prices of things have a tendency to agree with 
the cost of production. On the basis of this conception, the 
abstract existence of natural value (natural price), normal 
value (normal price) or equilibrium price is recognised as 
the centre of fluctuations in market prices. The reason is 
that although the market price is determined by the relation 
between demand and supply, if it is higher than the cost of 
production and brings an· unusually big profit, the under-
taking attracts both capital and labour, resulting in an 
increase in production and a decline in price. If, on the 
contrary, the market price is lower than the cost of produc-
tion, as it is impossible to carryon business at a loss, 
producers will reduce production or suspend it altogether. 
This will cause a decrease in supply and a rise in price. 
Thus, the theory contends, the market price fluctuates 
around the cost of production. Sometimes, it rises above it 
and at other times it falls below it. But the market price 
has a tendency to find its proper level at the cost of 
production. 
J. S. Mill says, "Persons whose capital is already em-
barked, and cannot be easily extricated, will persevere for 
a considerable time without profit, and have been known to 
persevere even at a loss, in hopes of better times. But 
they will not do so indefinitely, when there is nothing to 
indicate that times are likely to improve."" Because" Capita-
li;ots will not go on permanently producing at a loss."" 
Marshall also says. "In a trade which uses very expensive 
plant, the prime cost'" of goods is but a small part of their 
total cost;" and an order at much less than their normal 
11, 2) J. S. Mill, Principle:> of Political Economy, Ashley's Edition p. 451. 
:n, 4} See, Marshall, .. Principles of Economics, 8th. Ed., p. 359. 
----~ 
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price may leave a large surplus above their prime cost. But 
if producers accept such orders in their anxiety to prevent 
their plant from being idle, they glut the market and tend 
to prevent prices from reviving. In fact however they seldom 
pursue this policy constantly and without moderation. If 
they did, they might ruin many of those in the trade, them· 
selves perhaps among the number; and in that case a revival 
of demand would find little response in supply, and would 
raise violently the prices of the goods produced by the trade. 
Extreme variations of this kind are in the long run beneficial 
neither to producers nor to consumers; and general opinion 
is not altogether hostile to that code of trade morality which 
condemns the action of anyone who 'spoils the market' by 
being too ready to accept a price that does little more than 
cover the prime cost of his goods, and allows but little on 
account of his general expenses."') 
In order to ensure a permanent supply which meets the 
demand of the public, it is not enough that the price should 
merely cover the prime cost, it must, moreover, cover the 
general or supplementary cost (Marshall uses the words, 
general or supplementary cost, in the sense that it is the cost 
which covers the general business expense, and when he 
uses the words, the total cost,') he means the prime cost 
and the general cost put together. That is to say, the 
general or supplementary cost means the joint cost.)" 
"But unless it (the revenue of producers) is sufficient 
to cover in the long run a fair share of the general costs 
of the business, production will gradually fall off. In this 
way a controlling influence over the relatively quick move· 
ments of supply price during short periods is exercised by 
causes in the background. which range over a long period; 
and the fear of • spoiling the market' often makes those 
causes act more promptly than they otherwise would".') 
1) Marshall, op. cit. p. 375. 
2) Marshall, op. cit., p. 359, pp. 394. 
3) Taussig, Principles of Economics, Vol. I, pp. 214. 
4) Marshall, op. cit., p. 377: 
-----~------~. 
86 S. KOJIMA 
Such being the case, in a business which requires a great: 
amount of fixed capital, as in other businesses, the price of 
the articles produced has a tendency to agree with the cost 
of production in the long run. As nobody would continue 
production at a loss when the market price is continually 
lower than the cost of prod uction, producers wiII necessarily 
carry out the restriction or suspension of production, which 
wilI cause an automatic restriction of supply with the result 
that the market price wiII rise. Such is the opinion of those 
who believe in the normal value theory. 
The above is the explanation usually offered by many 
scholars who believe in the normal value theory. No doubt, 
this fundamental theory applies to freight rate which repre' 
sents the price of marine service. If the market freight 
continues to be below the cost of marine service, the surplus 
ships wiII eventually be broken up, and a reduction in the 
supply of tonnage wiII result. Thus, as in the case of the 
prices of other articles, freight develops a tendency to accord 
with the cost of marine service, even if there occur no 
change in the condition of those who demand tonnage. One 
thing which must be remembered in this connection is this: 
advocates of the normal value theory believe that the au-
tomatic decrease of supply which operates to restore the 
market price to the cost of production, when the former is 
below the latter, easily occurs. It is chiefly for the purpose 
of showing that such an optimistic view is held by the 
advocates of this theory that I have quoted J. S. Mill and 
Marshall. Not to say of other industry, in the shipping 
industry, so long as a natural competition goes on, an 
automatic decrease of supply-tonnage does not easily take 
place. 
Those who are engaged in marine transportation continue 
their business for a long time, as far as they have the 
wherewithal to do so at a loss, until the market freight 
reaches the laying-up point" in hopes of better times," even 
.. when there is nothing to indicate that times are likely to 
improve," as it is impossible to foresee what the future has 
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in store. Ships are laid up when the market freight declines 
to the laying-up point, but the fact of their being laid up 
does not mean an absolute decrease in the supply of tonnage, 
for the ships in such a state still exert a negative influence 
on the shipping market as potential suppliers of tonnage. 
The absolute decline of the supply of tonnage occurs only 
when ships are broken up. When it is due to the decline 
of freight, and not on account of superannuation, it takes 
place after the decline has spoiled the market. 
To explain this by means of the diagram already given, 
freight falls to the point r, instead of being kept at the 
point p, because the bc tonnage continues business at a loss, 
and because the ce tonnage, while being laid up, acts as 
potential suppliers, and in the shipping world "the fear of 
'spoiling the market'" "by being too ready to accept a 
price that does little more than cover the prime cost of one's 
goods, and allows but little on account of general expenses" 
by no means makes the "controlling influence over the 
relatively quick movements of supply price during short 
periods" "act promptly." For the bc tonnage to continue 
,business at a loss rather tends to "spoil the market" positive-
ly, and the fact of the ce tonnage lying idle is expected to 
"spoil the market" in a negative way. The owners of the 
tonnage falling between band c accept "orders at much 
less than their nonnal price ", as far as their financial 
circumstances permit, "in their anxiety to prevent their 
plant from being idle." In this way, "they glut the market 
and tend to prevent prices from reviving." It is not" seldom 
that they pursue this policy constantly and without modera-
tion." As a matter of fact, they do pursue such a policy as 
far as they are financially able to do so, provided there occur 
no change in the condition of those who demand tonnage. 
This may" .ruin many of those in the trade, themselves perhaps 
among the number." Unless things grow so bad as to "spoil 
the market," however, there will not be the breaking up of 
ships, which causes a diminution of supply, thereby restor-
ing the market freight fo the normal freight. This is inevi-
--..;:..---.-.--~--.- ... -... -------------
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table, seeing that ships involve quite a heavy expenditure 
even when they are laid up. Unless a way is provided by 
which the shipowners can be compensated for this expense, 
there can exist "no code of trade morality" which "con-
demns the action of" shipowners who accept "an order at 
a price wbich is far cheaper than the normal price." 
Thus, in the shipping business also, the market price, 
when it is below the cost of production, has a tendency to 
rise so as to agree with it in the end, but such a time does 
not come so soon as advocates of the normal value theory 
usually believe. It is not until after market is spoiled that 
it comes. This makes the owners of tramp steamers have 
recourse to a "joint laying-up agreement" or "the laying-up 
union" in self-defence, when there occurs an over-supply of 
tonnage. In this way, they try to avoid the danger of 
bankruptcy under the pressure of free competition, As 
regards the owners of regular liners who, unlike the owners 
tramp steamers, find it impossible to resort to the practice 
of laying-up their vessels when freight has dropped, but are 
obliged to continue competition, as far as their financial 
circumstances permit, for the protection of the lines which 
they have been operating, they go a step further and form 
a shipping ring or what is called the "Conference." In other 
words, the competition which is carried on in the shipping 
world by natural processes, causes the owners of tramp 
steamers to resort to methods calculated to modify competi-
tion by co-operation even for a time, when business depression 
prevails. It also causes the owners of regular liners to form 
a cartel among themselves which can ensure for them a 
monopolistic position by modifying or restricting mutual 
competition permanently. Thus, a state of affairs in which 
freight can be artificially controlled is created either tem-
porarily or permanently, independently of normal value 
principles. How these combinations affect the freight market 
I dealt with in detail in my article in the first number of 
this "Review." 
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